How dangerous commercial diving really is

There is no single commercial diving fatality rate, and anyone who gives you one is guessing

This is the uncomfortable starting point. Commercial diving is not a single trade with a single risk profile, and no statistics body in the world publishes a current fatality rate for it.

The US Bureau of Labor Statistics runs the most thorough occupational death register in the world, the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Its 2024 report, released on 19 February 2026, counted 5,070 fatal work injuries across the whole American economy, a rate of 3.3 per 100,000 full-time equivalent workers. Divers do not appear in it. They are not in the table of counts by selected occupation, and they are not in the table of rates. BLS publishes rates for broad occupational groups — farming, fishing and forestry at 25.4 per 100,000; construction and extraction at 12.6; transportation and material moving at 12.5 — and commercial divers are folded into installation, maintenance and repair at 8.9, alongside lift mechanics and wind turbine technicians.

The reason is arithmetic, not indifference. BLS's own employment survey put US commercial divers (occupation code 49-9092) at 2,790 people in May 2023. O*NET, drawing on BLS projections, gives 4,000 for 2025. With a population that small, a single bad year swings the rate by tens of points, and BLS suppresses estimates that are not statistically reliable. The same problem affects every national register.

So when a page tells you commercial diving has a fatality rate of X, ask three questions: which divers, which years, and divided by what. Most of the time the answer to the third question is "a number somebody estimated in the 1990s".

The number everyone quotes, and where it actually came from

If you have read anything about this topic you have met the figure "180 deaths per 100,000 divers per year, forty times the national average". It is in law firm marketing, in diving school prospectuses, in forum posts and in news articles. It has one origin.

On 12 June 1998, the CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report published a short study of nine occupational diving deaths in Alaska between 1990 and 1997. In the editorial note at the end, the authors added national context. Drawing on unpublished OSHA data from 1998, they observed that an average of five commercial diving deaths a year, set against an estimated 3,000 full-time US commercial divers, "corresponds to a rate of 180 deaths per 100,000 employed divers per year", which they described as 40 times the national average for all workers.

That sentence is the source of nearly every fatality-rate claim you will read. It is worth being precise about what it is and is not. It is a back-of-envelope rate, computed by public health researchers in 1998, from data that was never published, for a population they estimated rather than counted, covering American commercial diving as it was practised in the early 1990s. It was not wrong. It is simply very old, and it has been repeated ever since without the caveats the original authors attached to it.

The same MMWR report gives a figure that gets quoted far less and is better documented: NIOSH's National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities database recorded 56 occupational diving deaths in the United States between 1989 and 1994, about nine a year, across all kinds of diving work.

The published fatality rates, side by side

The most useful compilation of the published rates comes from a paper by Professor Andy Woods of the Institute of Energy and Environmental Flows at the University of Cambridge, circulated through the EM&I alliance and dated December 2022. He gathered the national estimates that do exist and expressed them per 10,000 divers per year. We have not been able to fetch all his underlying sources, so the UK and French figures below are given as he reports them.

Sources: CDC MMWR 47(22), 12 June 1998; A Report on Fatalities in Commercial Diving, University of Cambridge / EM&I, December 2022; BLS, National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2024, released 19 February 2026.

Read that table carefully and the spread is the real finding. A tenfold difference between the UK and the US estimates is not a measurement of two different risk levels. It is a measurement of two different definitions, two different decades and two different denominators. The Cambridge paper also records the comparisons the regulators themselves drew: HSE put diving at 12 to 24 times the fatality risk of the UK construction sector, and the French data put it at 8 to 10 times French construction.

Great Britain, 2020 to 2026: what HSE's own fatality lists show

Here is a check nobody else seems to have run. HSE publishes, year by year, the names and details of people killed in incidents reported to it in Great Britain. The lists give the date, the deceased's name and age, a one-line description of what happened, the location and the industry classification. They are as close to a primary record as a member of the public can get.

We read all six published years from 2020/21 to 2025/26 and searched every entry for diving, divers and drowning. Across the six lists HSE named 787 work-related deaths in Great Britain. Not one entry describes a diving fatality.

Source: HSE, names and details of fatalities, 2020/21, 2021/22, 2022/23, 2023/24, 2024/25 and 2025/26, consulted 8 October 2026.

For context on how different that is from the early years of the regime: HSE's own page on its diving role states that there were 24 fatal diving accidents in Great Britain in the eight years to 2003/04, and that many of those deaths were members of the public on recreational training courses supervised by paid instructors, not commercial divers at work.

The North Sea record since 1966, and what it tells you about trend

The single most informative dataset on commercial diving deaths is not a government one. The Diver Down Memorial Charity maintains a register of diving personnel who died while diving in the North Sea basin, compiled from Freedom of Information requests and industry records by Commander Jackie Warner RN and Jim Limbrick.

Source: Diver Down Memorial Charity, consulted 8 October 2026. The charity states the list may not be fully accurate and invites corrections.

Two thirds of fifty years of North Sea diving deaths happened in the first fourteen years. That is the whole story of this industry's safety record in one line. The men who died in the 1970s were working without standardised decompression tables, without a legal requirement for an independent emergency gas supply, and in many cases without a bell stage or a usable second means of recovery. The history of saturation diving is, read honestly, a history of each of those gaps being closed after somebody died in it.

Norway's record is documented even better, because the Norwegian state commissioned an inquiry into it. The Lossius commission, reporting on 31 December 2002, found 17 fatal diving accidents on the Norwegian sector during the pioneer period of 1965 to 1990, four of them involving Norwegians, out of a population of roughly 350 divers who worked the sector in those years.

What actually kills commercial divers

The proportions are consistent across every dataset that records cause. Divers do not mostly die of exotic pressure physics. They drown, or they run out of gas, or something holds them underwater until they drown.

Sources: CDC MMWR 47(22), 12 June 1998; OSHA 4141-09, Keep Workers Alive During Diving Operations, 2021; Woods, University of Cambridge / EM&I, December 2022.

Notice what is not in that list in any quantity: decompression sickness as a cause of death, shark attack, nitrogen narcosis, and the kind of pressure-related catastrophe that fills video compilations. Decompression sickness is a major cause of injury and of long-term harm. It is a minor cause of death. Drowning is the overwhelming cause of death, and almost every drowning has an upstream cause that was preventable: a line that was not tended, a hazard that was not isolated, a gas supply that was not independent.

This is why the paperwork matters so much in this trade, and why the role of the HSE coordinator on a diving project is not a bureaucratic imposition. The hazards that kill divers are nearly all identified in advance by somebody who then has to make sure the isolation actually happened.

Differential pressure: the hazard that kills inshore and inland divers

If you want to know where commercial divers are dying right now, in countries with functioning regulators, the answer is not the offshore oil industry. It is intakes, culverts, dams, locks, pipelines and penstocks.

Differential pressure, universally shortened to Delta P, is a pressure difference between two points in a water system. A diver working near an opening with water flowing through it is not fighting the flow; they are being pushed by the entire weight of water behind them. The force arrives faster than a human can react and does not relent. OSHA published a safety alert in 2021 after six Delta P fatalities between June 2019 and July 2021, five of them at power generation facilities. The Association of Diving Contractors International then convened a task force at the request of OSHA's Office of Maritime Enforcement and issued a Delta-P diving checklist in January 2022, which requires the capture zone around any opening to be calculated rather than estimated.

The worst single Delta P event on record happened on 25 February 2022 at Paria Fuel Trading Company's Pointe-à-Pierre terminal in Trinidad. Five divers from the contractor LMCS were working at about 18 m on a pipeline at berth 6. When they removed an inflatable plug, the pressure difference that had built up over the previous weeks opened the line and pulled all five inside. Four died. One, Christopher Boodram, crawled back out through the pipe over roughly three hours. The Commission of Enquiry appointed in April 2022 reported in November 2023 that Paria's conduct "could be characterised as gross negligence and consequently criminal", identified around eleven points at which the company failed to mount a proper rescue, and recommended the Director of Public Prosecutions consider corporate manslaughter charges. Charges were laid in September 2024 against both companies and three named individuals; all pleaded not guilty.

Anyone doing underwater work at thermal power station water intakes is working in exactly this hazard class. The control is not skill or fitness. It is a lock-out of the plant, verified by the diver's own team, with a written isolation certificate.

How dangerous is saturation diving, specifically?

Saturation diving is the deepest and most technically demanding form of the trade, and the public assumes it is therefore the most dangerous. The evidence is more interesting than that.

Start with how few people do it. Our own audit of the global fleet found 493 saturation diver berths across 28 vessels, and only 17 of 876 diving companies worldwide run saturation at all. Allowing for crew rotations and for the fact that most berths are not occupied most of the time, the global population of working saturation divers is in the low thousands at most. Any fatality rate computed from such a small denominator is statistically fragile, which is precisely why none is published. If you want to understand the work itself before the risk, start with what saturation diving actually is.

What is measurable is decompression sickness. The best study is a case-control analysis by Jacobsen and colleagues, published in Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine in 1997, using the complete records of a Norwegian offshore contractor from 1983 to 1990: 2,662 saturation dives, 779,623 saturation hours and 18,539 bell runs.

Source: Jacobsen G, Jacobsen JE, Peterson RE, McLellan JH, Brooke ST, Nome T, Brubakk AO, Decompression sickness from saturation diving: a case-control study of some diving exposure characteristics, Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine 1997;24(2):73-80. Data from 1983–1990.

So per dive, saturation carried about seven times the decompression sickness risk of surface-supplied work at the same company in the 1980s. But a saturation "dive" is a month-long exposure containing dozens of bell runs, so per working day the comparison reverses. The study also found the mechanism: the risk tracked the maximum relative pressure change between storage depths, and none of the 21 analysed cases came from a saturation held at a single storage depth. Yo-yoing the chamber depth is what hurt people.

The ways saturation divers die are specific to the system rather than to the depth. Three documented cases make the point.

Sources: Wildrake diving accident (citing the 1981 fatal accident inquiry determination); Giertsen JC et al., An Explosive Decompression Accident, American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology 9(2):94-101, 1988; Kulkarni AC, Saturation diver fatality due to hydrogen sulphide while working on a subsea pipeline, Diving and Hyperbaric Medicine 51(1), March 2021.

Chambers themselves have a fire history that is rarely discussed. A 2023 review in Polish Hyperbaric Research by Zieliński and colleagues, drawing on the Sheffield and Desautels compilations, counted 59 hyperbaric chamber fires worldwide between 1923 and 2000, with 117 deaths. Of those, 20 fires and 26 deaths were in decompression chambers and 2 fires and 4 deaths in diving bells; the majority, 32 fires and 81 deaths, were in clinical treatment chambers. Between 2007 and 2021 the review records fires in seven chambers with 13 deaths. Electric arcs and sparks were the commonest identified ignition source, and over a quarter of events had no fully explained source. In a pure oxygen or oxygen-enriched environment at pressure, materials that are merely flammable in air burn in a way that cannot be extinguished from inside.

Is it the most dangerous job? Commercial diving against other trades

The claim that saturation diving is the world's most dangerous job is a staple of listicles, and it does not survive contact with occupational data. The problem is that no statistics body publishes a diving rate to compare, so the comparison has to be made against the best-documented rates available.

Sources: BLS, The Economics Daily, 15 September 2014 (2013 detailed-occupation rates, preliminary); BLS, number and rate of fatal work injuries by occupation, 2024; BLS Table 4, rates by selected occupation 2021–2023. BLS stopped publishing rates for many detailed occupations after 2019.

Take the Cambridge compilation's UK figure of 2 to 4 per 10,000, which is 20 to 40 per 100,000, and British commercial diving in that estimate sits somewhere between roofing and refuse collection, well below American logging and fishing. Take the 1998 US figure of 180 per 100,000 and diving is roughly twice as lethal as logging was in 2013. Both of those statements are defensible from published sources and they cannot both describe the same industry today. What they describe is the width of the uncertainty.

There is one modern dataset that bears on offshore diving indirectly. IMCA's Annual Safety Statistics Report for 2025, built from data supplied by 167 contributing member companies covering 1,020,036,687 exposure hours, recorded seven fatalities across the whole marine contracting membership — four offshore, three onshore — a lost time injury frequency rate of 0.27 and a fatal accident rate of 0.69 per 100 million hours, computed on all seven deaths; the offshore-only rate, from the four offshore fatalities over 524,483,938 offshore hours, is 0.76. Those are very low numbers by any industrial standard. They cover vessel crews, project staff and divers together, and IMCA does not break out diving exposure separately, so they cannot be read as a diving rate. But the offshore subsea sector that diving belongs to is not, as a whole, a statistically dangerous place to work in 2025.

The divers nobody counts

Every figure above comes from a country with a functioning regulator, a reporting duty and a research community. Most of the world's underwater work is not done in those conditions, and this is where the real death and disability toll sits.

Sources: Prevalence and Risk Factors for Hearing Loss in Chilean Shellfish Divers, Annals of Global Health 84(3), 2018; Dysbaric Osteonecrosis in Divers, Cureus, 2026; CDC MMWR 47(22), 1998; Provisional report on diving-related fatalities in Australian waters in 2012, DHM 48(3), 2018; HSE safety bulletin HID 1-2011.

Eighty per cent of a Chilean fishing village's divers reporting repeated neurological decompression symptoms is not a statistic you will find in any offshore safety report, and it dwarfs anything recorded in the regulated sector. If you are coming into the trade through the artisanal route — and in much of Latin America that is the normal route, as our guide to the basic and intermediate shellfish diver qualifications in Chile explains — this is the risk profile you are actually entering, not the North Sea one. The same applies to diving on salmon farms, where Norwegian research found fish-farm divers were the group most likely to go back in the water after a physically demanding dive and least likely to get a day off after three such days.

Life expectancy and long-term health: what the research shows, and what it does not

"Commercial diver life expectancy" is one of the most-searched phrases on this subject, and the internet's answer is usually a confident number with no source. There is no published life expectancy figure for commercial divers. What exists is a small number of cohort studies, and they point in a direction most readers do not expect.

Sources: Irgens Å, Djurhuus R, Grønning M, Mortality among retired offshore divers in Norway, International Maritime Health 66(2), 2015; Examination of the long term health impact of diving: the ELTHI diving study, HSE Research Report 230, University of Aberdeen, 2004; Sundal E et al., Prevalence and causes of loss of consciousness in former North Sea occupational divers, International Maritime Health 64(3), 2013; Lossius commission report on the pioneer period, 31 December 2002.

Three things follow from that table, and they need stating separately because they get conflated.

First, there is no evidence that commercial divers die young. The Irgens study followed 386 Norwegian men who dived the North Sea between 1965 and 1990 — the worst-exposed cohort in the industry's history — and found their mortality indistinguishable from the general male population, with a point estimate slightly below it. The authors were careful: the cohort is small, the confidence interval is wide, they had no exposure data, and ill-defined or unknown causes of death were more frequent among divers (OR 3.48, 1.12–10.9). But if diving shortened life substantially, this is the cohort in which it would show, and it did not.

Second, the pioneer generation was genuinely harmed. The Lossius commission found that about three in four Norwegian pioneer divers had been exposed to a diving accident or diving illness, more than half had suffered decompression sickness, about one in five had lost consciousness underwater, and nearly one in five was on a disability pension. In Vilnes and Others v. Norway, decided on 5 December 2013, the European Court of Human Rights found Norway in breach of Article 8 of the Convention for failing to ensure that divers received essential information about the decompression tables being used on them. The Court recorded that some 350 to 400 pioneer divers developed health problems, that companies were permitted to keep their tables secret, that the Petroleum Directorate standardised tables only in 1990, and that significantly fewer divers suffered decompression sickness afterwards. The Court awarded each applicant €8,000 for non-pecuniary damage. The Court also found no violation of Article 2 or Article 3, and dismissed the complaints about the Bergen and fjord test dives, holding the divers had been sufficiently informed about those.

Third, the long-term neurological question is open, and anyone who tells you otherwise is overstating the evidence in one direction or the other. This deserves more than a sentence.

The largest study is HSE's ELTHI investigation, run by the University of Aberdeen and published in 2004: 1,540 professional divers and 1,035 offshore workers surveyed, a 10% clinical sub-sample examined, and a case-control MRI study of 102 divers who complained of forgetfulness against 100 who did not and 100 non-forgetful offshore workers. Divers reported forgetfulness three times as often as the comparison group, and the effect survived adjustment for welding exposure and lost-time accidents. Forgetful divers performed worse on objective memory and attention testing, but not at a level a clinician would call abnormal. On MRI, periventricular hyperintensities were associated with the forgetfulness complaint, and divers as a group were 1.92 times as likely as offshore workers to show subcortical and deep white matter hyperintensities — a difference unrelated to whether they complained of forgetfulness. The study's own conclusion was that it "did not identify any long term health effects associated with professional diving amounting to a clinical abnormality", while noting that the forgetfulness complaint came with real quality-of-life impairment and MRI changes consistent with a mild sub-clinical deficit. The authors called for research to establish whether this reflects progressive decline, a stable injury, or something that recovers after diving stops. Twenty-two years on, that research has not been done.

The Diving Medical Advisory Committee's position, stated in October 2006 and consistent with its April 2008 statement on health surveillance, is close to the same place: overall no difference in health status between commercial divers and non-divers; well-documented long-term effects limited to direct trauma, failure to recover fully from acute decompression illness, dysbaric osteonecrosis and noise-induced hearing loss; forgetfulness and musculoskeletal pain reported more often by divers but mild; and the clinical significance of small changes in lung and nervous system function "remains uncertain". DMAC's 2008 statement identifies the reason this question stays open: nobody systematically collects individual exposure data, so health effects cannot be tied to specific exposures. It recommends voluntary surveillance run by an independent body and kept strictly separate from annual fitness certification, because divers will not volunteer data that could cost them their medical.

What actually changes your own risk

Aggregate rates are the wrong tool for a personal decision. The variance within commercial diving is far larger than the difference between commercial diving and most other trades, and almost all of it is under the control of the operator and, to a degree, of you.

The factors that separate the safe end of this trade from the dangerous end are consistent across every dataset above:

Whether the hazard can be isolated and whether it actually was. Delta P kills divers because a valve was not locked out or a capture zone was not calculated. The hazard is lethal and the control is paperwork. The offshore sector largely solved this with permit-to-work systems; the inland and municipal sector has not.

Whether there is an independent emergency gas supply and a standby diver who can reach you. Loss of breathing gas is the single most preventable fatal mechanism, and gas cuts were the most common cause of underwater unconsciousness in the pre-1990 Norwegian cohort. Every modern regime requires bailout and a standby diver because of those deaths.

Whether you are inside a regulated regime at all. The gap between the Chilean artisanal figures and the HSE figures is not a gap in diver skill. It is the gap between a system with enforced depth limits, a competent supervisor, a decompression chamber on site and a medical certificate, and one without. If you are choosing where to train and work, the regime matters more than the school, and our directory of commercial diving schools is the place to work that out, because it records which school teaches to which standard.

Whether the depth and mode match the job. The 1997 Norwegian data shows saturation decompression sickness risk tracking the size of storage-depth excursions. The 300-metre depth ceiling that caps most of the fleet exists partly because the physiology beyond it is poorly characterised. Depth is not linearly dangerous, but excursions and repeated pressure changes are.

Whether your contract and your medical are sound. A diver who cannot afford to refuse a dive is a diver who will accept a bad one. Knowing what to check in a campaign contract before signing is a safety control, not a commercial one, and so is understanding what the work actually pays before you depend on it.

One last correction to a search phrase that comes up constantly. A safety stop and a decompression stop are not the same thing. A safety stop is a short optional pause, conventionally around 3 to 5 metres, on a dive that has no mandatory decompression obligation; skipping it is poor practice but not a decompression omission. A decompression stop is a required hold, at a depth and for a duration fixed by the table or computer in use, on a dive whose profile has incurred an obligation; skipping one is omitted decompression and is a reportable incident requiring medical assessment. In commercial diving essentially all surface-supplied work carries decompression obligations, which is why the stops are run from the surface by a supervisor with a table and a stopwatch rather than left to the diver's judgement.

Sources

1. US Bureau of Labor Statistics — National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2024, released 19 February 2026, consulted 8 October 2026.
2. US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Number and rate of fatal work injuries by occupation, 2024, consulted 8 October 2026.
3. US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Table 3, fatal occupational injuries by selected occupations, 2020–2024, consulted 8 October 2026.
4. US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Table 4, fatal work injury rates by selected occupations, 2021–2023, consulted 8 October 2026.
5. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Economics Daily — Fatal work injury rates by occupation, 2013, 15 September 2014, consulted 8 October 2026.
6. US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Occupational Employment and Wages, Commercial Divers (49-9092), May 2023, consulted 8 October 2026.
7. O*NET OnLine — 49-9092.00 Commercial Divers, 2025 wage and 2025–2035 projections data, consulted 8 October 2026.
8. CDC, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47(22) — Deaths Associated with Occupational Diving, Alaska, 1990–1997, 12 June 1998, consulted 8 October 2026.
9. UK Health and Safety Executive — HSE and diving, consulted 8 October 2026.
10. UK Health and Safety Executive — Safety bulletin HID 1-2011, dangers of diving for shellfish, 22 June 2011, consulted 8 October 2026.
11. UK Health and Safety Executive — 2020 to 2021 names and details of fatalities, consulted 8 October 2026.
12. UK Health and Safety Executive — 2021 to 2022 names and details of fatalities, consulted 8 October 2026.
13. UK Health and Safety Executive — 2022 to 2023 names and details of fatalities, consulted 8 October 2026.
14. UK Health and Safety Executive — 2023 to 2024 names and details of fatalities, consulted 8 October 2026.
15. UK Health and Safety Executive — 2024 to 2025 names and details of fatalities, consulted 8 October 2026.
16. UK Health and Safety Executive — 2025 to 2026 names and details of fatalities, consulted 8 October 2026.
17. UK Health and Safety Executive — Medical requirements for diving, updated 2 December 2025, consulted 8 October 2026.
18. Andy Woods, Institute of Energy and Environmental Flows, University of Cambridge — A Report on Fatalities in Commercial Diving, dated December 2022, consulted 8 October 2026.
19. IMCA — Annual Safety Statistics Report 2025, consulted 8 October 2026.
20. IMCA — Safety statistics, consulted 8 October 2026.
21. Macdiarmid JI, Ross JAS et al. — Examination of the long term health impact of diving: the ELTHI diving study, HSE Research Report 230, University of Aberdeen for the Health and Safety Executive, 2004, consulted 8 October 2026.
22. Diving Medical Advisory Committee — Statement on Commercial Diving and Health, October 2006, consulted 8 October 2026.
23. Diving Medical Advisory Committee — Statement on Health Surveillance of Commercial Divers, April 2008, consulted 8 October 2026.
24. Irgens Å, Djurhuus R, Grønning M — Mortality among retired offshore divers in Norway, International Maritime Health 66(2), 2015, consulted 8 October 2026.
25. Sundal E, Irgens Å, Troland K, Thorsen E, Grønning M — Prevalence and causes of loss of consciousness in former North Sea occupational divers, International Maritime Health 64(3), 2013, consulted 8 October 2026.
26. Irgens Å, Troland K, Djurhuus R, Grønning M — Diving exposure and health effects in divers working in different areas of professional diving, International Maritime Health 67(4), 2016, consulted 8 October 2026.
27. Jacobsen G et al. — Decompression sickness from saturation diving: a case-control study of some diving exposure characteristics, Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine 24(2), 1997, consulted 8 October 2026.
28. Havtil (Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority) — Lossius commission, report of the commission of inquiry into the pioneer period of North Sea diving, 31 December 2002, consulted 8 October 2026.
29. European Court of Human Rights — judgment, Vilnes and Others v. Norway (no. 52806/09), 5 December 2013, consulted 8 October 2026.
30. Giertsen JC, Sandstad E, Morild I, Bang G, Bjersand AJ, Eidsvik S — An Explosive Decompression Accident, American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology 9(2):94-101, 1988, consulted 8 October 2026.
31. Wikipedia — Wildrake diving accident, citing Sheriff D J Risk's determination of 13 November 1981, consulted 8 October 2026.
32. Diver Down Memorial Charity — about the memorial charity, consulted 8 October 2026.
33. OSHA 4141-09 — Keep Workers Alive During Diving Operations, 2021, consulted 8 October 2026.
34. Association of Diving Contractors International — Delta-P Diving Checklist, 28 January 2022, consulted 8 October 2026.
35. Wikipedia — 2022 Paria diving disaster, summarising the Commission of Enquiry report of November 2023, consulted 8 October 2026.
36. Kulkarni AC — Saturation diver fatality due to hydrogen sulphide while working on a subsea pipeline, Diving and Hyperbaric Medicine 51(1), March 2021, consulted 8 October 2026.
37. Zieliński E, Dzięgielewski P, Kowalczyk M, Henrykowska G — Fire in the Hyperbaric Chamber: Review of the Literature, Polish Hyperbaric Research 85(4):43-54, 2023, consulted 8 October 2026.
38. Abdelrazik Y — Dysbaric Osteonecrosis in Divers: A Narrative Review, Cureus 18, 30 January 2026, consulted 8 October 2026.
39. Garrido Campos MA, Hindelang BA, Siqueira de Carvalho D, Urzúa Finke I, Herrera R, Radon K — Prevalence and Risk Factors for Hearing Loss in Chilean Shellfish Divers, Annals of Global Health 84(3):442-449, 2018, consulted 8 October 2026.
40. Lippmann J, Lawrence C, Fock A, Jamieson S — Provisional report on diving-related fatalities in Australian waters in 2012, Diving and Hyperbaric Medicine 48(3):141-167, September 2018, consulted 8 October 2026.
41. Divernet — report on the BSAC Annual Diving Incident Report 2024, 2 November 2025, consulted 8 October 2026.

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